Author: Katy Cojuhari – 05/01/2026
Apéro Géopolitique – “Arctic: New Strategic Frontier of the 21st Century”
The Arctic’s geopolitical significance has expanded dramatically in the early 21st century. Once insulated by ice and distance, the region is now increasingly accessible due to climate change, opening new maritime routes and exposing previously unreachable natural resources. Simultaneously, the Arctic has become the object of broader global rivalries involving the United States, Russia and China.
During the Apéro Géopolitique conference Amb. Brunson McKinley, career U.S. diplomat and former Director General of the International Organization for Migration in Geneva, Dr. Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, and Hicheme Lehmici, geopolitical expert and lecturer at the SWISS UMEF University analysed the Arctic’s transformation, focusing on how major powers conceptualize control, access, and security in the High North. The conference on the Arctic was organized in cooperation with the SWISS UMEF University of Applied Science Institute at the Chateau d’Aïre on December 9, 2025.
Katy Cojuhari, moderator
“Gold Rush” in the Arctic
-Why does the Arctic today remind us of the “gold rush” towards a new El Dorado? Why is it becoming so important, and who are the main pretenders on Arctic routes?
Hicheme Lehmici: The Arctic region is becoming increasingly important from a strategic and geopolitical point of view. We are speaking about an enormous territory—around 14 million square km—with a population of only about 4 million inhabitants. Today, all eyes are focused on the Arctic, not only because the U.S. President Donald Trump has reiterated his proposal to integrate Greenland into the United States, but because of a broader set of geopolitical dynamics.
The Arctic is often described as a new El Dorado. This perception comes from several studies suggesting that the region contains significant undiscovered natural resources. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, approximately 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and 30% of undiscovered natural gas reserves are located in the Arctic. In addition, the region is believed to hold critical resources such as nickel, copper, uranium, and rare earth elements, all of which are essential for the industrial and technological transformations currently underway.
Greenland, in particular, is often cited as having major potential in rare earths and uranium. However, this narrative must be qualified. A number of major multinational companies have already attempted operations in the Arctic, especially in Greenland, and most of these projects have been abandoned. Shell, for example, withdrew after investing billions of dollars because drilling operations proved technically unviable and economically unsustainable under extreme environmental conditions. On land, drilling often requires penetrating tens or even hundreds of meters of ice. Offshore operations are limited by ice cover for much of the year. These realities mean that Arctic extraction costs are estimated to be two to five times higher than in non-Arctic regions.
Beyond economics, there is also a legal dimension. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, states exercise sovereignty over an Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 nautical miles. Beyond that, sovereignty can extend if a state proves that its continental shelf continues further. This has produced intense legal competition, particularly around the Lomonosov Ridge, an area believed to be rich in hydrocarbons and strategic minerals. Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway are all involved in these disputes.
Another major expectation concerns new Arctic maritime routes. We speak about: the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast; the Northwest Passage through Canadian waters, and the potential Transpolar Route, passing near the North Pole and avoiding coastal legal disputes. However, these routes remain marginal. The Northern Sea Route sees around 100 transits per year, while the Suez Canal handles roughly 20,000 ships annually, and the Strait of Malacca around 100,000. Arctic shipping involves smaller tonnage and higher risks. Therefore, while the Arctic offers long-term strategic opportunities, it should not be seen as an immediate energy Eldorado or a new Arabian Peninsula. The reality is far more complex and constrained.
When we examine the relationship between Arctic competition and the war in Ukraine, we see two movements that appear contradictory but are deeply connected.
On the one hand, the United States recognizes that it is very late in the Arctic competition. There is a profound asymmetry in capabilities. Russia has invested for decades and now possesses overwhelming advantages, particularly through its fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers and Arctic-adapted military systems.
The United States could theoretically catch up, but this would require 20 to 30 years of sustained investment. Even China, which is not an Arctic state, is already more present than the U.S. through its Polar Silk Road strategy and its modern icebreaker fleet. In this context, the Arctic represents a strong incentive for Washington to re-engage with Russia. We have seen discussions about large-scale investments, including potential cooperation with companies such as Exxon in Siberia and the Arctic, involving tens of billions of dollars. From a purely strategic calculation, supporting Ukraine indefinitely maintains military-industrial momentum, but rapprochement with Russia offers access to enormous economic and strategic opportunities in the Arctic. This creates a structural tension in U.S. policy.
At the same time, NATO’s expansion through Finland and Sweden increases geographical pressure on Russia. However, this does not fundamentally alter the balance of power in the Arctic, where Russia remains dominant due to its infrastructure, technology, and experience. This leads me to think that the Arctic could become a bargaining space—a factor pushing the United States toward closer cooperation with Russia, particularly in the context of containing China.
Chances for the US to buy Greenland
-In today’s world, where diplomacy is becoming less important, we’re no longer particularly surprised by Trump’s offer to Denmark to buy Greenland. What are the chances of this deal being successful? How can the Arctic clause in Trump’s Ukraine peace plan be understood in this context?
Amb. Brunson McKinley: Before addressing Greenland directly, I would like to provide some context. The Trump administration’s foreign policy focuses on four main regions: the Western Hemisphere, Russia, China and the Middle East. Three of these four focuses have a clear Arctic dimension.
The Arctic is important to the Western Hemisphere because it is the northern extension of the Monroe Doctrine, which asserts that no foreign military power should establish influence in the Western Hemisphere. This doctrine also discourages major foreign commercial influence. There is also a military dimension. The Arctic is the shortest path for intercontinental ballistic missiles from Russia, China or North Korea. This makes the Arctic central to U.S. strategic planning.
Regarding Russia, President Trump has long sought rapprochement. This reflects not only political ambitions but also interest from the American business community, particularly in Arctic energy projects. At present, the war in Ukraine is blocking this rapprochement. Talks to end the fighting are in progress, conducted primarily between Washington and Moscow, with others being informed afterward.
China, although not an Arctic state, seeks access to Arctic routes and resources. The United States sees China as its primary strategic rival and will attempt to limit Chinese influence in the Arctic, and here success depends heavily on U.S.–Russia relations.
As for Greenland, U.S. interest is not new. The United States sought to acquire Greenland in the 19th century, again in the early 20th century, and most notably under President Truman in the 1940s. Greenland may not be Trump’s top priority, but it remains strategically important. President Trump’s main goal in the Arctic is better relations with Russia for strategic reasons, including economic cooperation, but Ukraine stands in the way of that goal.
If the U.S. succeeds in improving relations with Russia, it will have a greater ability to limit China’s Arctic ambitions. If it fails, there is little Washington can do to prevent China from expanding its presence. The U.S. is not going to start sinking Chinese icebreakers. The strategy toward China is one of sticks and carrots—containing China where possible while redirecting its economic dynamism into channels that are compatible with U.S. interests.
Greenland is strategically important because it lies within the Western Hemisphere and is geographically close to the North Pole. It is essential for missile defense, surveillance, and Arctic access. But Greenland is not necessarily President Trump’s top priority. At the same time, Greenland will not disappear from the agenda. It will return when conditions allow. In the meantime, as members of NATO, both Greenland and Canada are already firmly on “Team USA”. There is an American military base already on the island. Any future agreements for drilling in Greenland will almost certainly go to American firms.
The US – Denmark tensions over Greenland
-I would like to ask for an honest answer: how did Denmark react to Trump’s idea for Greenland? May you share your view to the potential conflict between the Kingdom of Denmark and the USA over Greenland? What about NATO?
Dr. Flemming Splidsboel Hansen: For those who may not be fully familiar with it, the Kingdom of Denmark consists of Denmark, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland. Denmark is therefore an Arctic state because of Greenland. Before answering the question directly, it is important to set the scene, because there are several different conflicts unfolding in the Arctic.
First, there is a resource conflict, which is relatively mild and generally managed in a cooperative manner. Arctic states are defining access to their continental shelves and the resources associated with them. The most famous example is the dispute between the Kingdom of Denmark and Canada over Hans Island, a small island between Greenland and Canada. This dispute has been handled humorously: Canadian troops would place a bottle of whisky on the island; Danish troops would replace it with schnapps. This illustrates the character of some Arctic disputes—but they are still real disputes.
Second, there is a political and military conflict, which has intensified since 2014. We have seen increasing militarization of the Arctic, particularly on the Russian side. Russia has emphasized its access and dominance, and as we have heard, the Arctic is the shortest route for intercontinental ballistic missiles. This military dimension has become more pronounced with the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. Today, we have seven Arctic states that are NATO members, and Russia.
Third, and most importantly for Denmark, we now have a serious conflict between the Kingdom of Denmark and the United States. This conflict is particularly concerning because it reflects a return to very traditional power politics—the idea that states can simply buy territory. Historically, territorial acquisition made sense when land itself was considered inherently valuable, even if its resources were inaccessible. Today, although Arctic resources remain difficult to extract, territorial control has returned as a strategic objective.
When Donald Trump, during his first presidency, proposed buying Greenland as if it were a real estate transaction, the Danish Prime Minister famously responded that the idea was absurd. Donald Trump took great offense at this reaction. Today, the situation has evolved. There is not only renewed discussion about purchasing Greenland, but also suggestions of taking Greenland by military means. This escalation makes the situation much more serious.
A critical turning point occurred when Donald Trump Jr. travelled to Greenland in January last year on what was described as a private visit. He spent only a few hours in Nuuk, but in my view, this visit constituted an information and influence operation, aimed at both Greenlandic and U.S. public opinion. We must be able to speak openly about this – this was not a neutral visit. It was designed to influence perceptions and political debate.
Following this, Denmark significantly increased its vigilance. For reasons that remain unclear, the Danish Foreign Ministry established a night watch system in Copenhagen. Every night, officials monitor developments in the United States and prepare a report for policymakers by 7:00 a.m. This reflects a high level of urgency.
We have also seen the appointment of a new U.S. ambassador, whose primary task appears to be increasing U.S. influence over Greenland. During his first visit to Greenland, a press conference was organized at very short notice. Danish media were unable to attend, while Greenlandic media were present. Notably, Denmark was not mentioned in the official communication, while Greenland was emphasized. We interpret this as an attempt to create friction between Greenland and Denmark. This is therefore an important political situation.
Will there be a military confrontation? Let me be very clear: there will be no direct military confrontation between Denmark and the United States. Denmark cannot fight the United States. Greenland has no military. Denmark does maintain a military presence in Greenland, but it is not designed to confront the United States. What we are witnessing is not a military conflict, but a political, strategic, and psychological struggle over sovereignty, influence, and long-term positioning.
In addition to these issues, we must consider China. Historically, Arctic states—including Russia—insisted that Arctic affairs were the responsibility of Arctic states alone. China, despite defining itself as a “near-Arctic state,” was kept at arm’s length. Since 2022, this has changed. Russia has effectively opened the back door to China in the Arctic. This is the price Russia has paid for Chinese political and economic support in the context of the war in Ukraine. This represents a significant transformation of Arctic politics. Russia’s previous position—that the Arctic was exclusively for Arctic states—has been abandoned. In new Russian strategy documents, any state willing to take a “constructive approach” is now welcomed in the Arctic. This creates an additional layer of strategic complexity for Denmark and other Arctic states.
Greenland’s future is an extremely sensitive issue. There is a strong sense in Greenland that independence—or at least a fundamentally different status—is approaching. My assessment is that we should prepare for Greenlandic independence within one to two decades.
Regarding NATO, we have witnessed an unprecedented situation: the United States threatened to use force against Greenland—a territory belonging to a NATO member state. In response, France and Germany publicly supported Denmark. This is extremely damaging for alliance cohesion. Possible future scenarios include: NATO survives but in a weakened form. A “European NATO within NATO” emerges, particularly around the Nordic–Baltic region. Or gradual erosion of NATO. The damage to the transatlantic relationship has already been done. Europe can no longer assume that U.S. security guarantees are automatic or unconditional.
