Author: Ecaterina Cojuhari – 08/05/2025
In recent years, Europe has faced several significant migration crises, influenced by factors such as conflict (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa), economic instability, and even climate change. The war in Ukraine, which began in February 2022, caused one of the fastest and most significant displacement crises in Europe since World War II. At the same time, migration is not just an economic or humanitarian issue; it has increasingly become a geopolitical tool, influencing state behavior and international relations.
During Apéro Géopolitique discussion Ambassador Brunson McKinley, Diplomat at the State Department, Former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Former Director General of the International Organization for Migration at the UN, Oleksandr Kapustin, Deputy Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN Office and other International Organizations in Geneva and Hicheme Lehmici, geopolitical analyst, and a lecturer at the Swiss UMEF, gave their vision to the most acute questions.
The conference took place at Chateau d’Aïre in cooperation with the SWISS UMEF University of Applied Sciences Institute, the Geneva Center for Security Policy Alumni Office and its Geneva Hub on April 15.
A Western phenomenon – open border style migration is coming to an end.
-One of the basic issues of the Trump administration was the migration question: from Mexico and other countries to the United States. How do you assess these paths, this policy? How it influences particularly Europe?
Brunson McKinley: I’m going to concentrate on the broader migration dimension to try to help us understand what’s happening to this issue which is no longer just an economic or humanitarian, but has become a political, diplomatic and geopolitical issue too. Mr. Trump has essentially closed the borders, or is trying to do so, cracking down on illegal migration, pushing back against asylum abuse, going so far as to deport people that don’t have any business being in the country. A hardline approach. At the same time, I assure you, Mr. Trump and his administration will continue to operate a migration program, but it will be a very different one from the last administration. It won’t be an open borders program. It will be a selected migration program using the tools already available, the H2 visas and the other things you know about, in order to bring into the United States those foreigners who have the skills and the qualifications that will benefit the U. S. economy. Trump and company are going to try to put in place a managed migration system.
Trump is not the only one doing it. He’s a little bit ahead of the pack, I think. But if you look at Germany, Greece, Italy, Denmark, Poland, or Hungary, the governments there are fed up with illegal migration, what they consider to be excessive migration. They are looking for ways to slow it and push it back. Now, whether they’ll succeed or not depends. It’s a very complicated issue. Many of those countries are members of the European Union, which has its own approach and its own rules. But I think they’re going to try. So I think we are seeing a pushback against mass migration and it’s not just Trump.
Two other points: you will have noticed probably that migration is part of globalization. Globalization means lowering the borders that restrict the flow of information, capital, investment, goods, and services. In the West, I want to emphasize, the globalization mentality was extended to the movement of people, and migration became a constituent part of globalization. The most visible and hence, in some ways the most problematic form of globalization. And as globalization retreats, you will see a lot of pressure on migration. But keep in mind that a good half of the world, maybe three-fifths of the world, never did consider migration to be part of globalization. The Asian countries, generally speaking, which are very implicated in globalization, have never had open borders. In fact, they’re mostly very strict about who gets in their country and who gets to stay. If you look at Japan, Korea, China, these are countries that do not have migration. So open border style migration is a Western phenomenon, and I think it’s coming to an end.
Migration trends in the EU
– What is the main migration flows in Europe?
Hicheme Lehmici: As of January 1, 2024, the European Union had approximately 29 million third-country nationals, representing 6.4% of the population. This number increases when including people born outside the EU but who have acquired citizenship. Migration is primarily driven by economic reasons: the search for jobs and better living conditions. Added to this are security factors (political instability, conflicts) and the growing effects of climate change: currently there are between 30 and 50 million climate refugees, with a projected 260 million by 2025, particularly from Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and parts of Africa.
Contrary to common belief, most migration flows are not from South to North, but from South to South: 70% move to other developing countries. There are also less visible forms of migration, such as family reunification and study-related migration — with some students remaining in their host countries.
A few examples illustrate this diversity:
- France (2023): 7.3 million immigrants (10.7% of the population), including 2.5 million naturalized citizens. Main origins: Maghreb, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Poland, Turkey, Sub-Saharan Africa.
- Germany: earlier flows of Turkish workers, followed by post-USSR migrants, then refugees from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine.
- Italy: 6.7 million foreign-born individuals (11%), mainly from Romania, the Balkans, the Maghreb, China, and Sub-Saharan Africa. More Italians live abroad (60 to 90 million) than in the country.
Far from being a new phenomenon, migration is part of long-term history. Migrants represented 5% of the global population in 1900 and 3.5% today. It is not the quantity that has changed, but the direction of flows. Between 1870 and 1930, 90% of migration flowed from Europe to the rest of the world, reshaping entire continents (the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa). Thus, the migratory phenomenon is not one of “brown peoples from the South” invading the North, but an ancient process structured by deep-rooted dynamics. However, the collective imagination remains marked by the fear inherited from the era of the “great invasions.”
Over 11 million Ukrainians remain displaced, nearly 25% of the population.
–May I ask you share a picture how many Ukrainians arrived in the EU, caused by the war? What are the main challenges in coordinating with the hosting countries?
Mr. Oleksandr Kapustin: Let me start by clarifying a legal context, a word on terminology. We often hear the notion – the war in Ukraine. It’s important to be precise. What we’re dealing with is not a conflict in Ukraine — it’s an international armed conflict caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, in violation of the UN Charter. This matters because it shapes how Ukrainians are legally classified. Most are not refugees in the sense which defined by the 1951 Convention on Refugees and the Protocol. They are not fleeing persecution by their own government. Instead, they are people forcibly displaced by the war. They fall under the so-called temporary protection schemes, which is emergency response for the mass influxes, and not refugee status as defined by default.
Russia’s war has caused the fastest growing and one of the largest displacement crises since the World War II with almost a third of Ukraine’s population forced to flee their homes. Let me illustrate this by some figures: in just three weeks after the invasion started, over 3 million people fled Ukraine. By mid-2022, 14 million were displaced, 7 million internally and 6. 3 million abroad. As of now, over 11 million Ukrainians remain displaced, nearly a quarter of the population. Around 6. 9 million are outside Ukraine and 6. 4 million of them, which comprises 92%, are in Europe. Within the EU: as for January 2025, Germany has 1. 1 million; Poland has 1 million; the Czech Republic has 400,000. Beyond the EU, the largest hosting countries are Norway, Switzerland, Moldova, and also the US and Canada, which host over half a million of Ukrainians. So, in this regard, I would like to take this moment to sincerely thank all countries and all people around the world which opened their doors and hearts to Ukrainians fleeing this war. Their solidarity is very much appreciated in Ukraine, beyond Ukraine and will be always remembered.
So, as to the EU response, a pivotal step was made by the EU with the first-ever activation of the Temporary Protection Directive in March 2022. This gave Ukrainians immediate access to residency, work, healthcare, education without going through regular asylum procedures. I mentioned certain countries but it’s also worth mentioning neighboring countries like Moldova, Poland, Hungary, a bit more distant like the Czech Republic. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum aims to address this through fair responsibility sharing between the countries. But we must acknowledge that international funding is not keeping the pace. The 2022 Regional Refugee Response Plan for Ukrainians was only 42% funded. Currently we are already in April and the 2025 plan is faring even worse – only 3% funded so far. This funding gap limits the capacity of humanitarian actors and increases the strains on host countries.
There are several areas where Ukraine has been working closely with UNHCR and host governments. First, it’s related to facilitating short-term travel to Ukraine without losing temporary protection rights. That is important for those who are evaluating return options. Another area is protecting vulnerable groups, especially children from institutions, and combating human trafficking and gender-based violence. To help address this and other challenges, the newly established Ministry of National Unity launched the project “Unity Hubs” across Europe, where displaced Ukrainians can find safe spaces offering support and services.
Geopolitical causes of migration in Europe
-Do you think EU countries are coping with migration flows from Arab and African countries? How is it reflected on the state security and border controls of the EU countries? Why are right-wing radical sentiments growing in the EU?
Hicheme Lehmici: An often-overlooked aspect in the analysis of migration flows is the security dimension. If we examine migration from Africa (both Sub-Saharan and North), the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent, we observe that over the past two decades, it has been largely linked to international crises triggered or worsened by the West. For instance:
- The Yugoslav war was hastened by Germany’s unilateral recognition of Slovenian and then Croatian independence, contributing to the federation’s collapse.
- The 2003 Iraq war destroyed a relatively stable state.
- In Somalia, an intervention conducted under humanitarian pretexts ended with a hasty withdrawal, leaving behind unresolved chaos.
- In Afghanistan, external interventions deeply destabilized the country.
- In Syria, foreign meddling from the outset helped turn a rebellion into a full-scale civil war.
- Finally, Libya was destroyed by a NATO military intervention following a civil war. This destruction led to millions of refugees.
The collapse of Libya had a domino effect on the Sahel: its arsenal dispersed, and jihadist groups emerged in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. A large share of current migration flows can be traced back to these destabilizations. Without such interventions, Europe would likely not be facing the current scale of migration. The consequences are also ideological: a sense of civilizational submersion, identity-based fears. Yet no one prevented Europeans from having children, and many migrants suffer from extreme trauma (massacres, war, exile). It is therefore not surprising that integration is difficult. The profiles of many perpetrators of attacks reveal more severe psychiatric disorders than ideological convictions.
The migration issue is fueling growing political radicalization. In Germany, the AfD polls at 24–25%, driven in part by discontent over sanctions against Russia. In France, the rise of the Rassemblement National is partly based on the same mechanisms.
The more economically attractive a country is, the more it draws migrants. Two questions must therefore be clearly posed: When will the West stop destabilizing states in the Global South? A significant share of current migration directly results from such interference. How can Europe cope with demographic aging? Even with closed borders, many sectors structurally depend on foreign labour.
But beyond the economic question, the core issue is political responsibility. One emblematic case: the war in Libya. Before 2011, Libya was Africa’s most developed country according to the HDI, with a standard of living comparable to some European countries. Yet under the pretext of protecting civilians, NATO intervened — with support from Gulf powers — leading to the total collapse of the Libyan state, the proliferation of weapons, the exodus of foreign workers, and the transformation of Libya into an uncontrollable migration hub toward Europe. Today, Western leaders refuse to acknowledge this responsibility, while exploiting the effects they themselves caused, as if they were external to the origins. The populations, meanwhile, see this inconsistency. They are angry not only at the lack of solutions but also at the cynicism of elites who exploit the consequences of chaos they helped create.
Social integration of Ukrainians
– How Ukrainians are adapting in European countries and in Switzerland, and what is the role of national governments and international organizations like UNHCR?
Mr. Oleksandr Kapustin: One of the factors that shaped the response to the Ukrainian displacement was a cultural proximity. Ukrainians are largely seen and see themselves as Europeans with shared values, Christian traditions, relatively high level of education. All that has eased initial integration in the receiving societies. Of course, over time fatigue is a real risk for any country, both among host societies and displaced populations. Despite economic challenges and stretched services, host communities have shown remarkable solidarity. But still, we need to build mutual understanding, address cultural and communication gaps, fight discrimination, misinformation, and stereotypes. The UNHCR and the International Organization of Migration have been indispensable in coordinating response, facilitating access to employment, healthcare, protection, both organizations being agile and effective.
Recent data reflect continued progress among displaced Ukrainians in achieving socio-economic inclusion, including employment, education, and language acquisition. The latest UNHCR report (March 2025), which refers specifically to the ten countries covered by the Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) for Ukraine — Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia — shows that in 2024, the labor force participation rate among Ukrainians in these countries reached 70%, nearly matching the host community average of 73%. Employment rose by nine percentage points over the previous year, reaching 64%. Despite these gains, underemployment remains a challenge, often linked to language proficiency gaps and difficulties with the recognition of professional qualifications.
In terms of economic integration, displaced Ukrainians are making a notable contribution to host economies. In Poland, their presence, reportedly, is estimated to have added between 0.7% and 1.1% to GDP growth in 2023. In Czechia – displaced persons are contributing twice as much in taxes as they receive in social benefits. In discussions around the so-called “refugee fatigue,” it is worth reframing the question: can we afford not to invest in the potential of displaced persons?
Regarding return intentions, the majority of displaced Ukrainians abroad still express hope to return home, although this aspiration is gradually declining. Data from 2023 and 2024 clearly illustrate this trend. In 2023, 77% of Ukrainians indicated they wished to return someday; by the end of 2024, this figure had decreased to 61%. Meanwhile, 12% stated they did not intend to return, and 27% remained undecided. As of the end of 2024, over one million Ukrainians had already returned and remained in Ukraine for at least three months. However, the ongoing Russian armed aggression continues to be the primary barrier to large-scale returns.
From the government perspective, every displaced Ukrainian is very wanted back home. Their skills and experience will be crucial for recovery and rebuilding. That is why we are prioritizing policies that enable safe, voluntary, and dignified return, while calling on international partners to keep supporting resilience and reconstruction.
Time for a new migration convention
– You were the Director General of the International Organization for Migration for 10 years. Can you explain what role international organizations like yours play in managing immigration, and if they can mitigate geopolitical tensions? And from another side, how countries can balance between security and their humanitarian obligations?
Brunson McKinley: The international organizations do, of course, play an important role with migrants and refugees in implementing programs, which, however, are funded by national governments. It’s the national governments also that make the key decisions about the status and the treatment of refugees and migrants. It’s the national governments that are in charge of migration. And for a long time, it was the interior ministers in those governments which had the reins in their hands.
That has changed now since migration has become such a hot political issue. Now it’s more and more in the office of the Prime Minister, the President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and other ministries that deal with the broader political and geopolitical aspects of the problem. But we should not forget that it is the governments that make the decisions. And I think Mr. Kapustin has given us a very good example of that when he pointed out that the Ukrainians in the EU, who have fled their country, are mostly not refugees, that is, not people who would qualify under the terms of the convention. And this is certainly true. Instead, national governments have invented a kind of a special made-to-measure de facto procedure, the temporary protection status. To cover these people who are fleeing war. And this existed in the United States for a long, long time. And many people from the conflicts of Central America, for example, who came to the United States were under temporary protection. But this was something that was decided, legislated and implemented by governments, and didn’t have much to do with the international framework at all, though organizations like IOM, which would help out as contractors to the governments to take care of people if they could.
But what we’re faced with really, when you look at it clearly and perhaps even somewhat cynically, is a breakdown or at least a serious gap in the international legal coverage of migrants and refugees, people who flee their home country. You should read the Refugee Convention sometime. The people who negotiated that in the 1940s and 1950s were very careful to keep it quite limited. You have to have suffered persecution or have a well-founded fear of persecution for one of five reasons. And the Ukrainians, for example, don’t qualify. They’re not persecuted because of their ethnicity or their religion or their political views. They’re just getting out of harm’s way, and there is no convention to cover that, but those are the vast majority of people on the move.
There’s no convention that covers economic migration, even though economic migration is the biggest piece of the migration pie. In some countries, there are rules and regulations. I mentioned before the Asian countries that have tightly controlled systems of migration. I’m not necessarily recommending those to Europe, but they do exist. Those systems exist. They’re enforced. They’re strict. But it is a well-managed system, and people continue to apply for it. There’s nothing like that. In the West, it’s sort of come as you are, with or without an invitation, do your best, apply for asylum. That’s not a bad way to go because then you’ll tie up the court system and the judges for years and they’ll probably give up on trying to deport you or marry a local. There are lots of ways to beat the system, but there’s no convention. I’d like to suggest to you that it might not be a bad idea to try to write a migration convention and put in place a system to manage migration. For the benefit of sending and receiving countries, and the benefit of the migrations themselves, this is probably an impossible dream, but who knows? The old system, open borders, and ‘Come as you are’ is breaking down. People don’t like the globalized migration to the West anymore, and they’re starting to vote against it. Maybe the time has come when the diplomats of Western Europe and North America and some other countries can come together and establish a migration convention that would help the whole world to manage these problems.
Ukrainian experience can influence internation norms to be more inclusive
-With the European Union relatively open approach to Ukrainian refugees, could it become a model, which can influence global norms? Or it’s an exception which is connected with geopolitical situation and it will just reinforce this inequality and division?
Oleksandr Kapustin: I think the Ukrainian case offers a really important lens for looking at where refugee protection might be heading, both in Europe and beyond. I have already mentioned about the EU response to the Ukrainian displacement – the Temporary Protection Directive which had not been used before and was activated very quickly after the full-scale invasion in March 2022. That gave Ukrainians across the EU immediate access to stay, work, education, healthcare without going through the long asylum procedures. It’s still in place until at least March 2026, and it has been a lifeline for millions of Ukrainians. But — and it’s a big but — it’s called “temporary protection” for a reason. It doesn’t provide long-term certainty. People might not feel secure signing a lease or planning a career if they don’t know what happens in two years. That uncertainty is real.
Also, how this protection is applied varies by country. The Directive is EU-wide, but each country interprets it a bit differently in their national systems. So, in practice, the experience of a Ukrainian refugee in Germany might look quite different from one in Italy or Poland. So, the application of those rules will be very different sometimes. Right now, EU Member States are debating what comes next. Do they extend protection again? Do they transition it to something else? And the decision to be made shortly will give us additional insights as to the effectiveness of this model over a longer time-frame. Whether it could be the model for the future, not only for the European region, but also for regions beyond Europe? Whether it’s a one-time exception or template? It’s true the political and geographical proximity of Ukraine played a major role, but nothing precludes it from not being replicated in other regions. The Temporary Protection Directive showed that it’s possible to coordinate fast collective protection at scale, and to do so in a dignified way. That is something which other regions can learn from. There is real potential here for regional frameworks like this, not just in Europe, but elsewhere, that are grounded in cooperation, shared responsibility and clarity. It just requires political will and agreement on basic principles – who is going to be protected for how long and what rights they have. So, the answer to that question is – yes, there is a real potential for Ukrainian displacement experience to influence norms in a more inclusive and pragmatic direction.