Autore: Francesco Trani – 15/03/2026
Razionalità individuale, irrazionalità collettiva: il conflitto USA-Israele-Iran come sistema complesso
Francesco Trani
Individual Rationality, Collective Irrationality: The U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict as a Complex System
ABSTRACT— This paper argues that the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict constitutes a classic collective action problem: multiple actors acting rationally according to their own calculations collectively produce an outcome that none of them has chosen. The analysis employs a multi-level framework that models the interactions among these actors across four simultaneous domains: strategic–political, military, economic–energy, and informational–demographic. The study is anchored in developments up to February 2026, including Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025 and the subsequent IAEA inspection blackout.
The paper identifies three scenarios with differentiated probabilities: negotiated resolution (15–25%), war of attrition (50–60%), and global escalation (10–20%, conditional). The main conclusion is that Scenario B is structurally the most likely outcome for reasons that do not depend on the actors’ intentions but on the configuration of the system itself: the dispersion of Iran’s nuclear program, the automaticity of proxy responses, and the internal contradiction between declared objectives and the means required to achieve them.
The most underestimated repercussion is proliferative: regardless of the military outcome, both possible trajectories generate incentives for regional nuclearization that contradict the stated objective of non-proliferation. The recommendations follow a conditional logic: if the actors pursue the objectives they declare, the actions consistent with those objectives diverge significantly from the trajectories currently underway.
KEYWORDS: Iran nuclear program; U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict; collective action problem; strategic miscalculation; nuclear proliferation; Middle East security.
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